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Article  
Boeing, the IAM, and the NLRB: Why U.S. 
Labor Law Is Failing  
Julius G. Getman†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
In April 2011, the National Labor Relations Board’s 
(NLRB’s) Acting General Counsel, Lafe Solomon, issued a com-
plaint against The Boeing Company (Boeing).1 The complaint 
alleged that Boeing violated the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) by shifting assembly work on its 787 Dreamliner from 
Everett, Washington, to North Charleston, South Carolina.2 
According to the complaint, the company decided to shift work 
from Everett to North Charleston to retaliate against workers 
in Everett for past strikes—activity protected by the NLRA.3
The NLRB has been under constant attack ever since. 
Many of the Board’s critics have claimed to discern a conspiracy 
with “big labor”
 
4 to further the political fortunes of President 
Obama. Others accused the agency of having an anti-business, 
job-endangering agenda.5
 
†  Julius G. Getman, Earl E. Sheffield Regents Chair, The University of 
Texas at Austin School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge significant 
assistance in editing and research from former NLRB attorney Sonya Spiel-
berg. Copyright © 2014 by Julius G. Getman. 
 Joe Nocera, writing in the New York 
Times, stated, “Seriously, when has a government agency ever 
tried to dictate where a company makes its products? I can’t 
ever remember it happening. . . . I’ve become mildly obsessed 
 1. Complaint and Notice of Hearing at 1, 10, Boeing Co., No. 19–CA–
23431 (Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. June 20, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 2. Id. at 1, 5. 
 3. Id. at 6. 
 4. See, e.g., Editorial, NLRB Favors Unionized States, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/ 
2011/12/13/20111213editorial1214-nlrb-favors-unionized-states.html. 
 5. Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., How Democrats Hurt Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 
2011, at A25. 
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with the Boeing affair. Nothing matters more right now than 
job creation.”6
In this article, I will show that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (Board) has done nothing to warrant the torrent of 
criticism. The General Counsel’s action was consistent with the 
language of the NLRA and supported by precedent. It posed no 
serious threat to Boeing’s well-being, or even to its decision to 
assemble 787 Dreamliners in South Carolina. Properly under-
stood, the clamor over Boeing’s right to make corporate busi-
ness decisions demonstrates the weakness of the NLRB and not 
its rampant power. Indeed, the entire campaign against the 
Board appears to be part of a political effort aimed at organized 
labor and the last remnants of the New Deal legislation that 
created the NLRB. What is now needed is an effort to recreate 
the NLRB into the agency it was intended to be.  
  
I.  THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO THE 
BOARD’S COMPLAINT   
In the fall of 2009, Boeing faced a serious problem. Its new, 
lightweight, fuel-efficient 787 Dreamliner had elicited orders 
from all over the world, but Boeing did not have enough planes 
to meet promised time schedules.7 Much of the problem was 
caused by Boeing’s decision to outsource the manufacture of 
components to partner companies around the world and to 
adopt a “just-in-time” inventory system requiring that compo-
nents be delivered according to a precise schedule.8 Several of 
the suppliers and partners that were supposed to produce the 
components were years behind schedule, contributing to Boe-
ing’s backlog of nearly 900 orders.9 When Boeing finally re-
ceived the necessary parts, it was understandably under pres-
sure to speed up assembly.10
 
 6. Id. 
  
 7. Peter Cohan, For Boeing, It’s Finally Time to Test-Fly the 787 Dream-
liner, DAILY-FINANCE (Dec. 13, 2009, 11:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/ 
2009/12/13/will-boeing-finally-test-fly-the-787-dreamliner. 
 8. For a discussion of Boeing’s manufacturing model, see Debby Arkell, 
The Evolution of Creation, BOEING FRONTIERS (Mar. 2005), http://www.boeing 
.com/news/frontiers/archive/2005/march/mainfeature1.html. Boeing later ad-
mitted that outsourcing too much of the work to suppliers was a serious mis-
take. Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, New Problems with Boeing’s 787 Re-
vive Concerns About Its Reliability, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at B1, B4.  
 9. See Cohan, supra note 7. 
 10. See David Kesmodel, Boeing’s Dreamliner Makes Its Way to Japan: 
Executives Say They Plan to Nearly Double Jet’s Production Within Six 
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Boeing’s initial plans for the Dreamliner called for assem-
bly by its skilled unionized employees in Everett, Washington, 
part of Boeing’s Puget Sound complex.11 Before committing to 
assembly in Everett, Boeing had obtained financial incentives 
of over $3 billion from the Washington State Legislature.12 A 
production line capable of producing about seven Dreamliners 
per month was established in 2007.13 The Puget Sound unit, 
comprised of approximately 18,000 employees, had historically 
performed the final assembly of all Boeing planes.14
The assembly line workers in Puget Sound were represent-
ed by Local Lodge 751 of the International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM).
 
15 Relations between 
Boeing and the union were complex and often confrontational. 
Three of the previous five contract negotiations (in 1995, 2005, 
and 2008) had resulted in strikes.16 The two-month strike in 
2008 was particularly bitter.17
 
Months, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052970204422404576595193592207856. 
 Boeing’s stock tumbled in its af-
 11. In late 2003, Boeing announced that it would place the assembly line 
for the Dreamliner in Everett, Washington, after the Washington State Legis-
lature passed a tax and subsidy incentive package totaling more than $3.2 bil-
lion. See James Wallace, Boeing, State Make It Official—7E7 is Everett’s, 
SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/ 
business/article/Boeing-state-make-it-official-7E7-is-Everett-s-1132611.php. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Dominic Gates, Boeing’s Dreamliner Is Fastest-Selling New Jet, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, http://seattletimes.com/html/boeingaerospace/ 
2003650223_boeing04.html. 
 14. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 
Div. of Advice, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., to Richard L. Ahearn, Reg’l Dir., Re-
gion 16, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., at 3 (Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter NLRB Ad-
vice Memo], available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/fact 
-sheet-archives/boeing-complaint-fact-sheet/boeing-documents (follow “Advice 
Memo” hyperlink).  
 15. See IAM-Boeing Contract, IAM DISTRICT 751, http://www.iam751 
.org/pages/boeingcontract.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 16. See Darrin Hoop, IAM Strike Back on at Boeing, SOCIALIST-
WORKER.ORG (Sept. 5, 2008), http://socialistworker.org/2008/09/05/strike-back 
-on-at -boeing. 
 17. On October 6, 2008, Boeing’s CEO Jim McNerney sent a long e-mail to 
Boeing employees about the strike. NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 3 
(“McNerney stated that . . . ‘[t]he issue of competitiveness as it relates to this 
strike is a big deal[.]’ He also tied labor disputes to problems with Boeing’s 
customer relationships. After asserting that the union had recommended that 
its members reject contract offers and go on strike four of the last five negotia-
tions going back to 1995, he wrote, ‘We believe this track record of repeated 
union work stoppages is earning us a reputation as an unreliable supplier to 
our customers—who ultimately provide job security by buying our air-
planes.’”). 
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termath.18 During the summer of 2009, Boeing publically an-
nounced that it was considering opening a second production 
line for the Dreamliner line at its new facility in North 
Charleston rather than Everett because of its concern over 
strikes.19 However, Boeing spokesmen indicated to Washington 
state officials that it would prefer to use Everett because of the 
skill and experience of its workforce, as long as it could be as-
sured that the union would not strike.20
Boeing had acquired its North Charleston facility from 
Vought Aircraft, with which Boeing had previously contracted 
to manufacture the rear sections of the Dreamliner fuselage.
  
21 
The decision to purchase Vought came after Boeing had identi-
fied Vought as a “problem partner” because it had failed to de-
liver on schedule.22 According to Bloomberg News, “incomplete 
work at the facility had contributed to two years of delays for 
the new plane.”23 Early in July 2009, Boeing announced that it 
planned to purchase Vought for the avowed purpose of speeding 
up production of parts for the 787.24 At the time of the pur-
chase, Vought employees were represented by the IAM.25
Boeing announced that it had completed its purchase of 
Vought on July 30, 2009.
 
26 That same day, a Vought employee 
filed a petition with the NLRB, asking the Board to decertify 
the incumbent machinists’ union.27 A short time later, the 
NLRB scheduled a vote on whether the workers wished to re-
tain the IAM as their bargaining representative.28 Boeing ac-
tively opposed the union in the campaign that preceded the de-
certification vote.29
 
 18. Id. 
 According to the NLRB Advice Memo: 
 19. Id. at 4 (“[On October 17], Boeing’s Vice President for Government and 
Community Relations Fred Kiga spoke at an aerospace conference. . . . He re-
portedly also told the conference that ‘labor unrest’ could drive Boeing’s deci-
sion on where to build planes in the future.”). 
 20. See Boeing Balks at Strikes, SPOKESMAN REV. (July 9, 2009), http:// 
www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/jul/09/boeing-balks-at-strikes. 
 21. Susanna Ray, Boeing Agrees To Buy Vought Aircraft 787 Operations 
(Update4), BLOOMBERG (July 7, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=aVShtocbHO4E. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
 25. Id. at 5. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 6. 
 29. Id. at 5–6. 
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During August, Boeing denied the Union access to the employees in 
the North Charleston plant and wrote a memorandum to the employ-
ees stating that it preferred to “deal with employees directly without 
intermediaries.” Boeing also issued a FAQ document to the employees 
stating that the mass layoffs that took place at the Vought plant in 
late 2008 were due to the “unique situation created by the Everett 
strike.” Meanwhile, the South Carolina press was reporting that a de-
certification decision could influence where Boeing located the second 
787 assembly line.30
The employees voted decisively 199 to 68 in favor of decer-
tification.
 
31 Boeing now had a facility in which it could complete 
assembly of the Dreamliner without concern about strikes; alt-
hough the earlier production problems at Vought made clear 
that a great deal of training would be necessary for its workers 
to play a key role in assembly of the 787.32
Given the great backlog of 787 orders, it would have made 
sense for Boeing to establish new lines in both Everett and 
North Charleston.
  
33 However, instead of proceeding on both 
paths simultaneously, Boeing announced that it would estab-
lish a second line either in Everett or in South Carolina.34 It 
thereby publicly placed Washington State and South Carolina 
in competition for assembly work on the 787. Boeing was able 
to use the competition to obtain additional tax breaks and rev-
enue from South Carolina.35 In so doing, Boeing also ’explicitly 
pressured the IAM for a no-strike promise with regard to as-
sembly of the 78736
In October 2009, after several rounds of negotiations in-
volving the union and officials of both Washington State and 
 and implicitly expressed its displeasure 
with the union’s past strikes. 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Dominic Gates, Boeing Charleston Decertifies Machinists Union, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, http://seattletimes.com/html/boeingaerospace/ 
2009843246_boeing11.html. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Had it done so there would have been no basis for legal complaint by 
the union. The workers in Everett had no legal claim to be the only facility as-
sembling Dreamliners. See Boeing v. NLRB, A.B.A. LAB. & EMP. L. FLASH 
(Oct. 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ 
ll_flash/1110_aball_flash/1110_aball_flash_boeing_nlrb.html [hereinafter 
A.B.A. FLASH]. 
 34. Dominic Gates, Boeing, Union Deadlocked in Secret Talks over New 
787 Line, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, http://seattletimes.com/html/ 
boeingaerospace/2010113362_boeing22.html. 
 35. See NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 9. 
 36. Don McIntosh, Boeing Uses Jobs to Pressure Government, Union for 
Concessions, NW. LAB. PRESS (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.nwlaborpress.org/ 
2009/1016/10-16-09IAM.html. 
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South Carolina, Boeing announced that it would open its se-
cond line in South Carolina.37 Boeing officials stressed in a se-
ries of statements that the decision was based on its desire to 
avoid strikes such as those which had previously occurred at its 
unionized facilities.38
II.  THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES   
 
In March 2010, Local Lodge 751 filed unfair labor practice 
charges against Boeing on behalf of the workers at Everett.39 
The union charged violations of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of 
the NLRA.40 Section 8(a)(3) prohibits penalizing employees be-
cause they exercise their section 7 rights,41 which includes the 
right to strike.42 Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice to threaten employees for exercising their rights under the 
Act.43 The union claimed that by choosing to assemble planes in 
North Charleston rather than Everett, Boeing was punishing 
its workers in Everett because of their past strikes.44 It also al-
leged that statements Boeing officials made concerning its deci-
sion were unlawful threats of retaliation based on union activi-
ty.45
Under the NLRA, the NLRB’s General Counsel, acting on 
the basis of investigation by his or her staff, makes the initial 
decision as to the legal validity of a charge.
 
46 If the charge is 
deemed to be factually and legally sufficient, a complaint is is-
sued in the name of the General Counsel, which sets the stage 
for a hearing before an administrative law judge and review by 
the NLRB members.47
 
 37. NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 10. 
 
 38. Id. at 10–12. 
 39. Union Files NLRB Charges to Stop Illegal Intimidation, 751 AERO 
MECHANIC (Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. 751, Seattle, 
Wash.), Apr. 2010, at 2 [hereinafter Union Files Charges], available at http:// 
www.iam751.org/aero/April_2010_Aero.pdf. 
 40. See A.B.A. FLASH, supra note 33. 
 41. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012). 
 42. See id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 43. Id. § 158(a)(1). 
 44. Union Files Charges, supra note 39, at 2. The union claimed that vari-
ous statements by Boeing before and after choosing Charleston were intended 
to let its workers in Everett know that they would pay a price for exercising 
their rights under the NLRA. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. National Labor Relations Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2012). 
 47. Id. 
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Acting General Counsel Solomon considered the charge 
against Boeing for over a year.48 He repeatedly urged the par-
ties to settle the dispute through negotiation.49 Although he did 
not make a formal settlement recommendation, Solomon made 
clear that a sensible settlement would be in everyone’s interest 
and could be achieved best by the establishment of two new as-
sembly lines, one in Everett and one in North Charleston.50 
Boeing officials did not offer to settle the case on this basis.51
During the course of his investigation, as is typical in polit-
ically sensitive and legally complex cases, Solomon submitted 
the issue for study to the agency’s Advice Branch, which re-
sponded with a memorandum that included a detailed state-
ment of facts and a careful analysis of the law. The April 11, 
2011 “Advice Memo” concluded that Boeing had violated the 
law based on the “Employer’s coercive and threatening state-
ments and . . . the Employer’s decision to locate the second line 
at a nonunion facility and to establish a dual-sourcing supply 
program in retaliation for protected activity.”
 
52 The memo cited 
several Board cases holding that actions in effect punishing 
former strikers could not be justified on the basis of concern 
over future or past protected activity.53
On April 20, 2011, with no settlement in sight, General 
Counsel Solomon issued a complaint based on the legal analy-
sis contained in the memo.
 
54 In accordance with the law and 
long-standing NLRB practice, Solomon acted independently of 
the five members of the NLRB, who act as the agency’s adjudi-
catory arm.55
 
 48. See A.B.A. FLASH, supra note 33. 
 Several statements from Boeing officials were cit-
 49. See Aubrey Cohen, Judge Urges Settlement of NLRB Complaint 
Against Boeing, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, June 14, 2011, http://www 
.seattlepi.com/business/article/Judge-urges-settlement-of-NLRB-complaint 
-against-1423811.php. 
 50. Telephone Conversation with Lafe Solomon, General Counsel, Nation-
al Labor Relations Board (Fall 2012). 
 51. Melanie Trottman, Boeing Rejects Union on Plant, WALL ST. J., June 
10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023042593045 
76375940769488316. 
 52. NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 1. 
 53. Id. at 14–16, 18–19. 
 54. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5 (“In or about October 2009 . . . Respond-
ent decided to transfer its second 787 Dreamliner production line of 3 planes 
per month from the Unit to its non-union site in North Charleston, South Car-
olina.”). 
 55. E-mail from Nancy Cleeland, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Nat’l Labor Rela-
tions Bd., to Tom Bettag, Exec. Producer, State of the Union (Apr. 27, 2011, 
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ed in the complaint.56 To remedy the alleged violation, the com-
plaint called for an order “requiring Respondent [Boeing] to . . . 
operate its second line of 787 Dreamliner aircraft assembly 
production in the State of Washington, utilizing supply 
lines . . . in the Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon, ar-
ea facilities.”57
Contrary to many subsequent accusations, the complaint 
did not order or suggest shutting down the South Carolina fa-
cility.
  
58 In fact, it specifically stated that “the Acting General 
Counsel does not seek to prohibit Respondent from making 
non-discriminatory decisions with respect to where work will be 
performed, including non-discriminatory decisions with respect 
to work at its North Charleston, South Carolina, facility.”59
A complaint by the General Counsel is the first step in a 
complex, often protracted legal process.
  
60 It is followed by an ev-
identiary hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), 
who makes suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law.61
 
3:52 PM), http://causeofaction.org/assets/uploads/2012/04/NLRB-FOIA 
-U00002880.pdf [hereinafter Cleeland Correction Email]. 
 
 56. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5 (“[In] its October 28, 2009, memoran-
dum entitled ‘787 Second Line, Questions and Answers for Managers,’ [Boe-
ing] informed employees, among other things, that its decision to locate the 
second 787 Dreamliner line in South Carolina was made in order to reduce 
Respondent’s vulnerability to delivery disruptions caused by work stoppag-
es. . . . [On] December 7, 2009, [Boeing Vice President Ray] Conner and 
[Spokesman Jim] Proulx in an article appearing in the Seattle Times, at-
tributed Respondent’s 787 Dreamliner production decision to use a ‘dual-
sourcing’ system and to contract with separate suppliers for the South Caroli-
na line to past Unit strikes. . . . [On] December 8, 2009, Conner in an article 
appearing in the Puget Sound Business Journal, attributed Respondent’s 787 
Dreamliner production decision to use a ‘dual-sourcing’ system and to contract 
with separate suppliers for the South Carolina line to past Unit strikes. . . . 
[On] March 2, 2010, [Boeing’s CEO of Commercial Airplanes Jim] Albaugh, in 
a video-taped interview with a Seattle Times reporter, stated that Respondent 
decided to locate its 787 Dreamliner second line in South Carolina because of 
past unit strikes.”). Boeing sent a memo to its managers explaining its deci-
sion: “‘In the final analysis, this came down to . . . diversifying the company to 
protect against the risk of production disruption . . . .’” NLRB Advice Memo, 
supra note 14, at 10 (quoting a Boeing memo from Oct. 28, 2009). 
 57. Complaint, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 58. Cleeland Correction Email, supra note 55. 
 59. Id. at 8. 
 60. See LEE MODJESKA & ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, 1 FEDERAL LABOR 
LAW: NLRB PRACTICE 38 (2013). 
 61. Id. at 56–58. The evidentiary hearing was held on June 14, 2011 and 
lasted for several days. See Get the Facts on NLRB v. Boeing, IAM DISTRICT 
751, http://www.iam.org/nlrb (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). The ALJ never issued 
a decision, however, because the parties reached a settlement before he could 
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The ALJ report is subject to review by a panel of Board mem-
bers.62 If the Board panel decides that an unfair labor practice 
has been committed, it issues an order requiring the charged 
party to take steps to remedy its illegal actions.63 But the 
Board’s order is not legally binding on a party until it is “en-
forced” on review by a Court of Appeals.64 The entire process, if 
played out to the end, is likely to consume several years. The 
complaint may be rejected at any step in the process.65 The 
Dickensian delays inherent in the process are often alleviated 
by settlement,66
Solomon knew that issuing the complaint would be contro-
versial. He had already been warned by Senator Lindsey Gra-
ham of South Carolina that if a complaint was filed, Graham 
was going after the NLRB “full guns a-blazing.”
 since the parties in most cases prefer compro-
mise to uncertainty. There is little doubt that the parties could 
have easily reached a settlement in this case by agreeing to 
create new lines both in North Charleston and in Everett. Boe-
ing needed all the production it could get.  
67 Solomon did 
not, however, anticipate the furor which followed.68
 
do so. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops Case Against Boeing After Un-
ion Reaches Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
12/10/business/labor-board-drops-case-against-boeing.html. 
  
 62. MODJESKA & MODJESKA, supra note 60, at 57. 
 63. Id. at 60–62. 
 64. Id. at 92. 
 65. See Unfair Labor Practice Process Chart, NLRB, http://www.nlrb 
.gov/resources/nlrb-process/unfair-labor-practice-process-chart (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2014). 
 66. Facilitate Settlements, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/ 
facilitate-settlements (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 67. Kevin Bogardus, Senator Threatened Labor Board Before Boeing 
Complaint, THE HILL, Nov. 9, 2011, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/ 
192737-sen-graham-threatened-labor-board-before-boeing-complaint-was-filed. 
When questioned by The Hill, Graham explained but did not disavow the 
comments. Id. “I meant that I would vigorously criticize the NLRB and active-
ly work to protect the economic interests of South Carolina,” he said in a 
statement. Id. “Those statements were made to convey to Mr. Solomon the po-
litical uproar that would occur both in South Carolina and nationally if the 
complaint was filed.” Id.  
 68. Conversation with Lafe Solomon, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations 
Bd. (Winter, 2013). 
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III.  THE BOARD UNDER ATTACK   
The first attacks were aimed at the complaint.69 Shortly af-
ter it was issued, former NLRB Chairman Peter Schaumber 
described Solomon’s action as “unprecedented,”70 a claim that 
was regularly repeated by critics.71 He added that “if the claim 
is upheld, it could jeopardize any company with unionized 
workers that wants to expand to a right-to-work state.”72
On May 12, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform wrote to Solomon advising him that the 
committee was investigating his decision to issue a complaint.
 He did 
not explain why this was so.  
73 
Solomon was ordered to provide the Committee with “all docu-
ments and communications referring or relating to the . . . in-
vestigation of Boeing.”74
 
 69. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour & Susanna Ray, Republicans Rally Be-
hind Boeing Over Labor Board Complaint, BLOOMBERG, May 5, 2011, http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-05/republicans-rally-behind-boeing-over-u 
-s-labor-board-complaint.html; Allen Smith, NLRB’s Boeing Complaint Tar-
geted, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (May 27, 2011), http://www.shrm.org/ 
legalissues/federalresources/pages/boeingcomplaint.aspx. 
 
 70. Judson Berger, Ex-Labor Board Chairman: Union-Backed Case 
Against Boeing ‘Unprecedented’, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www 
.foxnews.com/politics/2011/04/26/ex-labor-board-chairman-union-backed-case 
-boeing-unprecedented/#i. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney made 
Schaumber one of his labor advisors later that year. Josh Eidelson, New Trou-
ble for Ex-Romney Aide, SALON, May 3, 2012, http://www.salon.com/2012/05/ 
03/new_trouble_for_ex_romney_aide/. 
 71. See Adam Shah, Experts Say Allegations in NLRB Complaint Against 
Boeing Represent “Classic” Case of Labor Law Violations, MEDIA MATTERS FOR 
AMERICA (May 14, 2011, 12:11 AM), http://mediamatters.org/research/2011/05/ 
14/experts-say-allegations-in-nlrb-complaint-again/179638 (listing examples 
from media where complaint was critiqued as “unprecedented”). 
 72. Berger, supra note 70. 
 73. Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, Trey Gowdy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health Care, D.C., Census & 
the Nat’l Archives, & Dennis Ross, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, 
U.S. Postal Serv. and Labor Pol’y, to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, 
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (May 12, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/ 
sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/2011-05-12_dei_gowdy_ 
_ross_to_solomon-nlrb_-_ogc_boeing_iam_due_5-27.pdf. 
 74. Id. While Solomon agreed to testify at a Committee hearing, he con-
tested the scope of the information requested. Press Release, Nat’l Labor Rela-
tions Bd., Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon Testifies at Oversight Com-
mittee Field Hearing in South Carolina (June 17, 2011), available at http:// 
www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/acting-general-counsel-lafe-solomon 
-testifies-oversight-committee-field. In a letter from Celeste Mattina, Acting 
Deputy General Counsel, Mattina took the position that “Your letter broadly 
seeks confidential and privileged information, internal deliberative materials, 
attorney work product and settlement communications . . . .” Letter from Ce-
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On May 13, 2011, eleven Republican members of the House 
of Representatives sent Solomon a letter in which they accused 
him of “sacrificing South Carolina jobs to further an activist 
agenda.”75 The attacks soon were extended beyond the General 
Counsel to the agency generally. On May 14, George Will ar-
gued, “The NLRB has read a 76-year-old statute (the 1935 
Wagner Act) perversely . . . . [in a] reckless attempt to break a 
great corporation, and by extension all businesses, to govern-
ment’s saddle . . . .”76
An article published by the Heritage Foundation claimed 
that that the “National Labor Relations Board is twisting the 
law to benefit unions at the expense of the rule of law and the 
nation’s economy.”
 
77 It attributed the complaint to the Board’s 
hostility to South Carolina because it is a “right to work 
state.”78 The Wall Street Journal similarly claimed that “[t]he 
NLRB’s campaign against Boeing . . . is a government attempt 
to restrict the free movement of capital. It attempts to punish 
workers merely because their states passed right-to-work 
laws.”79
 
leste J. Mattina, Acting Deputy Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., to 
Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Trey Gowdy, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Health Care, D.C., Census & the Nat’l Archives, & 
Dennis Ross, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, U.S. Postal Serv. and 
Labor Pol’y (May 27, 2011), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/ 
files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/may_27.pdf. Mattina’s position was 
strongly supported by Senator Harkin, Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. In a letter to Solomon and to Chair 
Wilma Liebman, Senator Harkin wrote, “Turning over the requested docu-
ments could violate the due process rights of parties in this case . . . . The 
Board must exercise caution to preserve the integrity of its administrative 
processes from inappropriate political interference.” Letter from Tom Harkin, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, to Wilma Liebman, 
Chair, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. & Lafe Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, Nat’l 
Labor Relations Bd. (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/ 
default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/harken8-11-11.pdf. 
  
 75. Letter from Joe Wilson, Rep., et al., to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. 
Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (May 13, 2011), available at http://online 
.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/NLRBLetter.pdf. 
 76. George Will, The NLRB vs. Boeing: Obama Administration Puts Poli-
tics Before the Economy, SEATTLE TIMES, May 14, 2011, http://seattletimes 
.com/html/opinion/2015045500_will15.html. 
 77. HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY & JAMES SHERK, THE HERITAGE FOUND., 
LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 66 ON LABOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
OVERREACH AGAINST BOEING IMPERILS JOBS AND INVESTMENT (2011). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Op-Ed., The White House vs. Boeing, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2011, at 
A16. 
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The governor of South Carolina, Nikki Haley, regularly re-
peated the charge and, going beyond those who called for 
amendment of the NLRA, challenged the very existence of the 
Board, saying, “Anything that would disband the NRLB, I’d be 
the biggest cheerleader for.”80 And former South Carolina Gov-
ernor Mark Sanford, appearing on “FOX & Friends,” somehow 
attributed the complaint to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi: “You 
got Pelosi now, somebody from the opposite coast of America, 
saying, you know, if they don’t unionize, they need to shut the 
plant down. That goes against 200 years of tradition in Ameri-
ca . . . .”81 Yet another claim based on tradition was made by 
Boeing CEO Jim McNerney who, in a widely published press 
release, accused the NLRB of “a fundamental assault on the 
capitalist principles that have sustained America’s competi-
tiveness since it became the world’s largest economy nearly 140 
years ago.”82 On June 14, Newt Gingrich suggested that one of 
the things the Congress should do immediately is “defund the 
NLRB, which has gone into South Carolina to punish Boe-
ing . . . .”83
On June 17, Solomon testified under subpoena before the 
House Oversight Committee about the decision to issue a com-
plaint.
 
84 The hearing was held in North Charleston, and Gover-
nor Haley addressed the Committee in the afternoon.85
 
 80. Tanya Somanader, South Carolina Gov. Haley Insists on Disbanding 
the “Un-American” National Labor Relations Board, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 2, 
2011), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2011/09/02/311362/south-carolina-gov 
-haley-insists-on-disbanding-the-un-american-national-labor-relations-board/. 
 She re-
fused to be present during the morning while Solomon was 
present. In his opening comments, Committee Chair Darrell 
Issa implied that “Mr. Solomon’s decision to issue a complaint 
was tailored to reward the President’s powerful financial and 
 81. FOX & Friends: Mark Sanford Talks President’s Jobs Bill (FOX News 
television broadcast Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://video.foxnews.com/v/ 
1262155496001/mark-sanford-talks-presidents-jobs-bill/#sp=show-clips. 
 82. Jim McNerney, Op-Ed., Boeing Is Pro-Growth, Not Anti-Union, WALL 
ST. J., May 11, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870 
3730804576315141682547796. 
 83. Hearing Begins in Labor Complaint Against Boeing, KING 5 NEWS, 
June 14, 2011, http://www.king5.com/news/Hearing-to-begin-in-labor 
-complaint-against-Boeing-123814774.html. 
 84. Unionization Through Regulation: The NLRB’s Holding Pattern on 
Free Enterprise: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 
112th Cong. 3 (2011). I was present as an expert witness for the Democrats on 
the Committee. 
 85. Id. at 136. 
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political supporters—big labor . . . .”86
And finally, Mr. Solomon’s decision—which has been described as 
“loony,” “militant,” “retaliatory,” “unmerited,” “unprecedented,” and 
“the most politicized” decision in NRLB’s history—will doubtlessly 
cause collateral damage on the free movement of business and capital 
in the United States.
 He spared few adjectives 
in his attack: 
87
Chairman Issa’s comments set the tone for the Republican 
members of the Committee, who continued the attack on Solo-
mon.
 
88 Congressman Gowdy charged that “the NLRB has es-
sentially become a sycophant for labor unions. . . . [T]he NLRB 
seeks to give unions a historically unprecedented level of influ-
ence.”89 South Carolina Congressman Tim Scott suggested the 
complaint was an effort to “use union workers and their dues as 
a way to create a winning combination for a Presidential cam-
paign.”90
In the aftermath of the hearing, leading candidates for the 
Republican presidential nomination joined in the criticism.
 
91
 
 86. Id. at 3. 
 As 
they did so, the Republican charge against the NLRB expanded 
to include the assertion that the NLRB was seeking to prevent 
Boeing from opening a plant in South Carolina. Texas Governor 
Rick Perry was one of the first to sound the theme: “You see, 
President Barack Obama stacked the National Labor Relations 
Board with anti-business cronies who want to dictate to a pri-
 87. Id. at 5. 
 88. See generally id. Several of the Republicans argued that there could 
not be discrimination against the workers in Everett because none of them 
had lost work as a result of Boeing’s decision. Id. 
 89. Id. at 14. 
 90. Id. at 19. The Democrats on the Committee denied that the Board had 
done anything radical. Congresswoman Maloney denied that Boeing was being 
charged because it moved work to a right-to-work state. Congresswoman Nor-
ton argued that a hearing before the statutory process had been completed 
was improper interference with an independent agency. She pointed out that 
House and Senate members were “threatening subpoenas, demanding the 
privileged work product of counsel, and threatening to defund . . . the National 
Labor Relations Board, before it has made a decision or even heard the case.” 
Id. at 15. 
 91. See Amy Bingham, Obama Breaks Silence About Boeing v. NLRB La-
bor Dispute, ABC NEWS (June 29, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/ 
2011/06/obama-breaks-silence-about-boeing-v-nlrb-labor-dispute/ (“Nearly eve-
ry Republican presidential candidate has spoken out against the [Boeing] 
case.”). 
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vate company, Boeing, where they can build a plant.”92 This 
theme was quickly sounded by a variety of commentators.93
In a widely shown television ad, Governor Mitt Romney 
stated during the South Carolina primary, “The National Labor 
Relations Board, now stacked with union stooges selected by 
the President, says to a free enterprise like Boeing, ‘You can’t 
build a factory in South Carolina because South Carolina is a 
right-to-work state.’ That is simply un-American. . . .It’s politi-
cal payback of the worst kind.”
 
94
While the dispute raged, a series of bills to limit the 
Board’s authority was filed in the House of Representatives.
 
95 
One of the most draconian was H.R. 2587, introduced in July 
2011 by South Carolina Congressman Tim Scott, entitled the 
“Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act.”96
 
 92. Michael A. Fletcher, Labor Board Flies into Political Scene, J. GA-
ZETTE, Sept. 4, 2011, http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20110904/BIZ/ 
309049970/-1/BIZ09. 
 Its 
avowed purpose was to rescind the NLRB’s right to remedy un-
 93. Romney made a claim similar to Perry’s at a Republican debate. 
Bloomberg News/Washington Post Republican Debate at Dartmouth College, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/us/politics/ 
bloomberg-washington-post-republican-presidential-debate.html?pagewanted= 
all&_r=0. 
 94. Mitt Romney, Free Enterprise, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2012),  http://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=qytehw0vU9I. In an op-ed, Gary Shapiro, president and 
CEO of the Consumer Electronics Association, expanded on the point: 
Earlier this year the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) took the 
unprecedented action of telling a company that it cannot open a new 
factory in South Carolina. Never mind that Boeing had spent more 
than one billion dollars on a plant that was going to create 1,000 new 
jobs. The NLRB rubber-stamped the Washington state union com-
plaint that Boeing was somehow doing something illegal by adding a 
production facility in South Carolina rather than in Washington. So 
Airbus cheers as our own federal government stops an American 
company from hiring American workers and producing goods in the 
U.S. 
Gary Shapiro, How the Obama Administration Is Hurting Job Creation, 
FORBES, Aug. 17, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/garyshapiro/2011/08/17/ 
how-the-obama-administration-is-hurting-job-creation/. 
 95. See Job Protection Act, H.R. 1976, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1976; Tim Devaney, House Panel 
OK’s Bill to Limit NLRB, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, http://www 
.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/26/house-panel-oks-bill-to-limit-nlrb/? 
page=all (reporting on passage of H.R. 3094, “The Workforce Democracy and 
Fairness Act” in committee). 
 96. Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act, H.R. 2587, 112th 
Cong. (2011), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2587. 
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fair labor practices by requiring employers to undo unlawful ac-
tions.97
[T]he Board shall have no power to order an employer (or seek an or-
der against an employer) to restore or reinstate any work, product, 
production line, or equipment, to rescind any relocation, transfer, 
subcontracting, outsourcing, or other change regarding the location, 
entity, or employer who shall be engaged in production or other busi-
ness operations, or to require any employer to make an initial or addi-
tional investment at a particular plant, facility, or location.
 Its terms were sweeping: 
98
If passed into law, this bill would have rendered the NLRB 
ineffective in many areas. For example, under current law, em-
ployers in unionized facilities are required to bargain to im-
passe before making unilateral changes in wages, hours, or 
conditions of employment.
 
99 If an employer is found to have vio-
lated his duty by unilateral action, the Board typically orders it 
to restore the status quo.100 H.R. 2587 would have eliminated 
the standard remedy and left employers free to make basic uni-
lateral changes—eliminate lines of work, hire subcontractors, 
and switch jobs to non-union facilities—secure in the 
knowledge that the Board could not remedy its actions.101 The 
amendment thus would have run directly counter to the stated 
policy of the Act, “encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining.”102 Congressman Scott was appointed to 
the Senate by Governor Haley when Senator Jim DeMint re-
signed.103 His role in defending Boeing and attacking the NLRB 
was widely noted in reports of his appointment.104
The majority report on H.R. 2587 stated that “[t]o ensure 
employees can continue to exercise their rights under federal 
 
 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. See MODJESKA & MODJESKA, supra note 60, § 9:9 (explaining the basic 
principles of impasse). 
 100. See id. § 2:4 (discussing the NLRB’s remedial authority). 
 101. H.R. 2587. 
 102. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). H.R. 2587 would 
similarly give tacit permission to employers to do away with a segment of their 
enterprise that chooses to unionize, and it provides employers with another 
reason for telling employees that choosing to unionize is risky. H.R. 2587, § 2. 
It would also undercut the right to strike by making it far easier for employers 
to punish striking units by eliminating or transferring out their work. Id. 
 103. Aaron Blake & Chris Cillizza, Nikki Haley Appoints Rep. Tim Scott to 
Senate, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the 
-fix/wp/2012/12/17/nikki-haley-to-appoint-rep-tim-scott-to-senate. 
 104. See Earl Capps, Tim Scott: A Warrior for Worker Rights in the Senate, 
FRONTPAGE MAG, Dec. 27, 2012, http://www.frontpagemag.com/2012/earl 
-capps/tim-scott-a-warrior-for-worker-rights-in-the-senate. 
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labor law, the NLRB will continue to have more than a dozen 
strong remedies against unfair labor practices to protect work-
ers and hold unlawful employers accountable.”105 The report 
failed to list any of the strong remedies, and none come to 
mind.106 In fact, the Board’s remedial power under existing law 
is already severely restrained. The Board cannot impose sanc-
tions.107 It may not seek to punish wrongdoers.108 It cannot im-
pose fines.109 It cannot require anything that would amount to a 
new contract between the parties.110
While the Board was under attack, the majority of Demo-
crats, including President Obama, were silent.
  
111
The President today put distance between his administration and the 
labor board stressing that it is “an independent agency.”  
 When the 
President finally addressed the issue, his comments were nota-
ble for their attempt to create an impression of Presidential 
neutrality while simultaneously expressing sympathy towards 
Boeing’s entrepreneurial needs. According to ABC News: 
  “We can’t afford to have labor and management fighting all the 
time . . . .”  
. . . .  
  “As a general proposition, companies need to have the freedom to 
relocate—they have to follow the law, but that’s part of our system,” 
Obama said. “What I think defies common sense would be a notion 
that we would be shutting down a plant or laying off workers because 
labor and management can’t come to a sensible agreement.”112
Nowhere in the President’s statement is there a hint of 
support for the Board’s actions. Indeed, President Obama’s 
statement, while lacking political vitriol, is consistent with Re-
publican complaints about “shutting down a plant” and “laying 
off workers.”
 
113
 
 105. JOHN KLINE, PROTECTING JOBS FROM GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE 
ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 112-179, at 3 (2011). 
 The President not only took care to separate 
 106. But see id. at 5 (describing back-pay orders and bargaining orders as 
remedies that the NLRB would retain). 
 107. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. I was asked by lawyers at AFL-CIO to draft a sign-on letter opposing 
Congressman Scott’s bill, for submission to Congress, pointing out the bill’s 
deficiencies. I did so and my letter in final form was quickly signed by over 200 
academics. However, I was advised by savvy lawyers at AFL-CIO to edit my 
first draft because I focused too much on the Boeing case. “Many Democrats in 
Congress are uncomfortable with the issue,” I was told. 
 112. Bingham, supra note 91. 
 113. Id. The case against Boeing was made most strongly in pro-union 
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himself from the General Counsel’s actions but also, while the 
debate raged, went out of his way to show support for Boeing. 
As the Washington Times reported during a subsequent trip to 
Asia by the President: “A good deal of Mr. Obama’s trip has 
seemed like an effort to mend fences with the aerospace gi-
ant. Mr. McNerney [Boeing’s CEO] served as moderator for Mr. 
Obama’s question-and-answer session with business executives 
at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Hawaii 
last weekend.”114 The ties between the Obama administration 
and Boeing were close before the controversy and remain 
strong. William Daley, then Obama’s chief of staff, was on Boe-
ing’s board of directors when the company decided to open the 
second line in South Carolina.115 Boeing’s CEO, Jim McNerney, 
was Chair of the President’s Export Council, and the President 
appointed John Bryson, the longest-serving director on Boeing’s 
board, to be Secretary of Commerce.116
IV.  THE SETTLEMENT   
 
While the political attacks on the Board continued, Boeing 
and the IAM entered into secret negotiations.117
 
blogs. For example, on August 16, a post on Talking Union by Stan Sorscher 
argued that Boeing management was part of a campaign to destroy worker 
rights: 
 The union’s 
As the stakes continue to rise, it’s becoming clear that Boeing has no 
intention of settling the case, or ever complying with the law. They’ve 
said they expect to lose their case before the NLRB. Their goal is to 
re-write the law. They will use this case to assert a new right for em-
ployers to intimidate workers who strike. This would shift power 
away from workers on a scale similar to Ronald Reagan using scabs to 
break the Air Traffic Controllers’ strike in 1981. 
Stan Sorscher, Code of the Pirates: Boeing and the NLRB, TALKING UNION 
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://talkingunion.wordpress.com/2011/08/16/pirate-code. 
 114. Dave Boyer, Obama Backs Boeing in $21.7B Deal, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/17/obama-backs 
-boeing-in-217b-deal. 
 115. See Press Release, Boeing, Boeing Director William M. Daley Resigns 
Board Seat (Jan. 10, 2011), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=20295& 
item=1578 (reporting that Daley was a board member since 2006); see also 
Letter from Lindsey O. Graham, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Darrell Issa, Chair-
man, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (June 17, 2011), in Unionization 
Through Regulation: The NLRB’s Holding Pattern on Free Enterprise: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 9, 10 (2011) 
[hereinafter June 17 Graham Letter], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71079/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71079.pdf. 
 116. These connections are set forth in a letter of June 17, 2011 from Sena-
tor Lindsey Graham to Darrell Issa. June 17 Graham Letter, supra note 115. 
 117. Dominic Gates, Boeing, Machinists Reach Sweeping Agreement, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/business 
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chief negotiator was Vice President Rich Michalski.118 Chief ne-
gotiator for Boeing was Raymond Conner, President of Boeing’s 
commercial division.119 Michalski quickly concluded that Boeing 
wanted to restore good relations with the union.120 To the sur-
prise of commentators, on November 30, 2011, the parties 
reached agreement on a new collective bargaining contract that 
increased wages and benefits for Boeing’s unionized workers 
and assured them of continued employment.121 In return, the 
union promised not to strike until 2016.122 In the aftermath of 
the agreement, and at the urging of the Board’s General Coun-
sel, the ALJ dismissed the complaint against Boeing.123 Boeing 
and the union publicly exchanged compliments.124
The agreement established a “Joint Union/Boeing Council,” 
which meets “on a monthly basis, to review and discuss key el-
ements of the business and workforce.”
 
125 It also included a side 
letter which announced that “the Company will produce the 
737NG models and 737MAX models in Renton” and that “[t]he 
fabrication work currently being performed by bargaining unit 
employees in support of the 737 production will be contin-
ued . . . in Puget Sound and Portland.”126
 
technology/2016895323_boeingmax01.html. 
 The side letter also 
 118. Press Release, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Ma-
chinists to Vote on Deal to Land Boeing’s 737 MAX (Nov. 30, 2011), available 
at http://www.goiam.org/Ikea/index.php/news/press-releases/9543-machinists 
-to-vote-on-deal-to-land-boeings-737-max. 
 119. Jon Ostrower, 737 Max to Be Assembled in Renton on Contract Ap-
proval, FLIGHTGLOBAL (Dec. 8, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.flightglobal.com/ 
news/articles/737-max-to-be-assembled-in-renton-on-contract-approval 
-365734. 
 120. Press Release, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, supra 
note 118. 
 121. William Rogers, IAM and Boeing Reach Surprise Tentative Agreement, 
LEFT LAB. REP. (Dec. 2, 2011), http://leftlaborreporter.wordpress.com/2011/ 
12/02/iam-and-boeing-reach-surprise-tentative-agreement; see also COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOEING COMPANY AND INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO 
AND CERTAIN DISTRICTS AND LOCAL LODGES THEREOF (2011) [hereinafter 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT], available at http://www.iam751 
.org/pages/xzIAM-BOEING%20CBA%20with%20LOUs.pdf. 
 122. Id. at 75. 
 123. Jennifer Booton, Case Closed: Union Drops NLRB Complaint Against 
Boeing, FOX BUS. (Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/ 
industries/2011/12/09/case-closed-union-drops-nlrb-complaints-against 
-boeing/. 
 124. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 118. 
 125. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 121, at 176.  
 126. Id. at 178. 
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stated that “[t]he Company intends to continue production of 
wide-body airplanes in its Everett facilities.”127 Once the 
agreement was approved by the union’s members, Boeing 
opened the anticipated “temporary” surge line in Everett.128 As-
sembly of the 787 was thereafter done in three production lines: 
two in Washington and one in South Carolina.129 The agree-
ment quickly improved Boeing’s relationship with the machin-
ists union, as it was intended to do.130 In effect, the three-line 
option, which Solomon recognized as the likely way to settle the 
case,131
The settlement slowed, but did not stop, attacks on the 
Board. In the immediate aftermath of the settlement, leading 
Republicans, including the main candidates for the party’s 
presidential nomination, ignored the agreement and continued 
to attack the NLRB.
 had been adopted. 
132 Prior to the South Carolina primary 
election, Rick Santorum stated that “[i]n South Carolina, the 
National Labor Relations Board intervened directly in Boeing’s 
business decisions. . . . [T]he threat to ’all Americans’ economic 
freedom continues.”133 Mitt Romney made the issue an im-
portant part of his campaign, regularly calling the members of 
the Board “labor stooges.”134 Senator Graham announced that 
his campaign against the NLRB would continue.135
 
 127. Id. 
  
 128. John Gillie, Boeing Opening Third 787 Dreamliner Assembly Line, 
THE NEWS TRIB., Aug. 28, 2012, http://blog.thenewstribune.com/business/2012/ 
08/28/boeing-opening-third-787-dreamliner-assembly-line. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Booton, supra note 123. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Holly Rosenkrantz & Stephanie Armour, U.S. House Passes 
Limit Labor Board Powers After Boeing Case, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-15/u-s-house 
-passes-limit-labor-board-powers-after-boeing-case.html; Rick Santorum, The 
Sunshine State Needs Jobs Not Big Government, RED STATE (Jan. 29, 2012, 
2:12 PM), http://www.redstate.com/rjsantorum/2012/01/29/the-sunshine-state 
-needs-jobs-not-big-government. 
 133. Santorum, supra note 132. 
 134. Rosenkrantz & Armour, supra note 132. 
 135. Lindsey Graham, On President Obama’s Recess Appointments to the 
NLRB, ABOUT SENATOR GRAHAM BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.lgraham 
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutSenatorGraham.Blog&Content 
Record_id=aac4307c-802a-23ad-43b7-58870c8590ff (“The NLRB has become 
an out-of-control rogue bureaucracy. President Obama, by empowering this 
agency rather than reforming it, is making job creation even more difficult. I 
will continue to do everything in my power to put the brakes on the NLRB as 
currently constructed. I again encourage the appropriate House and Senate 
committees to investigate the contacts between the NLRB and Machinists Un-
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Representative Scott136 announced, “this outcome does not 
whitewash the fact that the NLRB has become a biased, politi-
cally-driven organization.”137 Representative Issa stated that 
the settlement would not deter the committee because of “seri-
ous questions that remain[ed] unanswered.”138
In February 2013, the Wall Street Journal published an 
opinion piece that applauded continuing congressional attacks 
on the NLRB and traced the conflict back to “the [B]oard’s out-
rageous action in [the Boeing] dispute.”
 Attacks on the 
Board and its members persisted as a consistent theme of 
House Republicans and their supporters. 
139 On January 31, 2013, 
Senators Scott and Blunt introduced a bill to shut down the 
Board pending a decision on the legality of interim Board ap-
pointments by President Obama.140 In his press release on the 
bill, Senator Scott specifically traced his opposition to the 
Board back to the Boeing dispute.141
The political nature of the attacks is underlined by their 
lack of connection to the factual circumstances of the Boeing 
complaint. Governor Romney’s statements epitomize the inac-
curacy of the attacks. As a graduate of Harvard Law School,
  
142
 
ion in their complaint against The Boeing Company.”).  
 
whose labor advisory committee included a former chairman of 
the NLRB, Romney should have known that the NLRB had 
taken no action and that a variety of hearings and reviews had 
 136. Scott has since been appointed to the Senate by Governor Haley to re-
place Senator Demint, who retired. Blake & Cillizza, supra note 103.  
 137. Raymond J. Keating, Need to Rein in NLRB as Political Hot Spot, THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL VIEW (Dec. 8, 2011), http://65.36.146.95/news/display.cfm? 
ID=4705. 
 138. Keith Laing, Issa: NLRB Withdrawal a ‘Victory,’ but Investigation Will 
Continue, THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2011, 6:49 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ 
transportation-report/labor-employment/198429-issa-nlrb-withdrawal-a 
-victory-but-investigation-will-continue-. 
 139. Bernie Marcus, The National Labor Relations Board Goes Rogue, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127 
887324162304578302590637139214. 
 140. Press Release, Senator Tim Scott, Senator Scott Joins Colleagues in 
Effort to Rein in NLRB, Reaffirm the Constitution (Jan. 31, 2013) (“Scott has 
been a leader in Congressional efforts to rein in the NLRB following the 
Board’s attempt to destroy jobs in South Carolina in 2011–12.”), available at 
http://www.scott.senate.gov/press-release/senator-scott-joins-colleagues-effort 
-rein-nlrb-reaffirm-constitution. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Ari Shapiro, At Harvard, Romney Wasn’t Your Typical Student, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (May 21, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/21/1531979 
70/at-harvard-romney-wasnt-your-typical-student. 
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to occur before one could speak of any action by the NLRB.143 
Neither the NLRB and its Board nor the General Counsel ever 
sought to prevent Boeing from opening a factory in South Caro-
lina. In fact, as previously pointed out, Boeing already had a 
factory in South Carolina.144 Furthermore, the complaint 
acknowledged that Boeing could transfer work to South Caroli-
na.145
Governor Romney stated that the NLRB’s actions were “po-
litical payback,”
 
146 but there is no evidence to support this alle-
gation, which the Board’s Acting General Counsel Lafe Solo-
mon has vigorously denied.147 Solomon, a career labor lawyer 
with no known political involvement and a reputation for hon-
orable behavior, has served as legal advisor to both conserva-
tive and liberal Board members. It is not as though the decision 
to issue a complaint was a departure from established NLRB 
law.148
Finally, no statement by the General Counsel or any em-
ployee of the Board suggests that South Carolina’s status as a 
right-to-work state played any part in the decision to issue a 
complaint.
  
149
 
 143. This point was stressed in the Oversight Committee hearings by the 
expert witness for the Republicans, Philip Miscimarra, a distinguished man-
agement lawyer. See Capital Investment, Relocations and Major Business 
Changes Under the NLRA: Hearing Before the Comm. on Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.morganlewis 
.com/pubs/MiscimarraStatement-CapInvstNLRA_17june11.pdf (“The General 
Counsel does not decide these cases. . . . [T]he General Counsel identifies the 
cases that warrant being litigated for resolution by the NLRB.”); see also Un-
ionization Through Regulation, supra note 
 The matter was not referred to in the Advice 
84 (statement of Philip 
Miscimarra) (“The Board’s general counsel acts like a traffic cop. He can issue 
a citation, but he doesn’t write the laws, and he doesn’t decide the cases.”). 
 144. See supra Part I. 
 145. Complaint, supra note 1. 
 146. Rosenkrantz & Armour, supra note 132. 
 147. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Lafe 
Solomon, acting general counsel, National Labor Relations Board). 
 148. Christy Concannon, The EAJA and the NLRB: Chilling the General 
Counsel’s Prerogative to Issue Unfair Labor Practice Complaints?, 36 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 175, 186 (1986) (“In NLRB proceedings, the issuance of a complaint is 
the starting point for any litigation.”). 
 149. It is not clear whom Romney had in mind when he used the phrase 
“labor stooges,” or whether, indeed, he can differentiate among the Board 
members. See, e.g., Robert Behre, Mitt Romney, in South Carolina, Takes Aim 
at NLRB, POLITICO, Sept. 12, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 
0911/63252.html#ixzz2uTCmA3WO. None of them can with any justification 
be deemed a “labor stooge.” At the time, the right wing’s most frequently tar-
geted Board member was Craig Becker, who was the subject of an editorial in 
The American Spectator. W. James Antle III, Craig Becker and Boeing, THE 
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Memo that provided the legal basis for issuance of a com-
plaint.150
V.  THE LEGALITY OF THE COMPLAINT   
 Most misleadingly, Romney’s statement was aired 
throughout the South Carolina campaign with no acknowl-
edgement of the fact that the case had already been settled to 
Boeing’s clearly expressed satisfaction.  
In attacking the General Counsel’s decision to issue a com-
plaint in the Boeing case, none of the Board’s critics seriously 
addressed the crucial question of whether Boeing actually vio-
lated the law by its actions. In fact, the case against Boeing in 
view of the language and basic policy of the NLRA is very 
strong. 
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to . . . any 
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization.”151 Did Boeing’s action 
in opening a new assembly line in South Carolina for the ex-
press purpose of avoiding the union constitute “discrimination 
under the NLRA”? The answer according to established prece-
dent is yes. Boeing treated the union members differently than 
it would have treated them had they not engaged in activity 
protected by the NLRA. As I pointed out many years ago, the 
term “discrimination” does not require an employer to treat un-
ion members and non-union members differently; as long as it 
treats them differently than it would have had they not en-
gaged in activity protected by the NLRA.152
 
AM. SPECTATOR, Oct. 3, 2011, http://spectator.org/articles/36851/craig-becker 
-and-boeing (“The Boeing case is arguably the biggest labor controversy of the 
Obama administration, and Becker is seen as emblematic of this White 
House’s tilt in favor of unions against businesses in a challenging economic 
environment.”). Becker is among the last people whom experts familiar with 
his work would refer to as a stooge. He is, among other things, a summa cum 
laude graduate of Yale and honors graduate of Yale Law School. Craig Becker, 
WASH. POST POLITICS, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/craig-becker/ 
gIQAmMDaAP_topic.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). Earlier in his career, 
Becker was a well-respected legal scholar who taught at UCLA and the Uni-
versity of Chicago. Id. 
 In this case, the 
term is particularly applicable because Boeing explicitly and 
publically distinguished between workers represented by a un-
ion and those not represented.  
 150. See NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14. 
 151. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 
 152. Julius G. Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insu-
late Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 735, 752–55 (1965).  
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Did Boeing’s action “discourage membership” as that term 
is used in the NLRA? Once again, the answer is clearly yes, 
since the Supreme Court has long held that to “encourage or 
discourage membership” in a union means also to encourage or 
discourage participation in union activities.153
  Boeing’s actions were also directly contrary to the basic 
purpose of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which the Supreme Court 
stated as “to allow employees to freely exercise their right to 
join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain 
from joining any union without imperiling their livelihood.”
  
154 It 
seems clear that Boeing violated both the spirit and the letter 
of the section by avowedly punishing its Everett employees for 
engaging in the basic union activity of striking. The clear line 
of authority supporting the issuance of a complaint was pointed 
out in the Advice Memo, which urged the Acting General Coun-
sel to issue a complaint.155 Similarly, there is little doubt under 
NLRB precedent, as set forth in the Advice Memo, that Boe-
ing’s statements, which explain its decision in terms of avoiding 
strikes, constituted a threat of retaliation under Board law in 
violation of § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.156 As several noted labor law 
professors have observed, the decision to issue a complaint was 
a correct one under existing Board case law.157 At a minimum, 
Solomon had a “presentable case.” Furthermore, as he has not-
ed, part of his function is to “present important legal issues to 
the Board for resolution.”158
 
 153. Radio Officers’ Union of the Commercial Tels., Union, A.F.L. v. 
N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 39–40 (1954). 
  
 154. Id. at 40. 
 155. See NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 17–23. 
 156. See id. at 14–17. 
 157. Adam Shah, Experts Say Allegations in NLRB Complaint Against Boe-
ing Represent “Classic” Case of Labor Law Violations, MEDIA MATTERS FOR 
AMERICA (May 14, 2011, 12:11 AM), http://mediamatters.org/research/2011/05/ 
14/experts-say-allegations-in-nlrb-complaint-again/179638. I served as expert 
witness for the Democrats on the Committee. I sought to respond to the out-
rage of the critics by pointing out that labor law experts characterized the 
General Counsel’s actions as being well within established NLRA jurispru-
dence. See Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Jul-
ius Getman) (“The political commentators saw in this case something unparal-
leled, dangerous, very powerful, threatening essentially the capitalist system 
and the ability of employers to transfer work from one facility to another. . . . 
The law professors saw this as a fairly routine Section 8(a)(3) charge. . . . This 
is not in any way an earth-shaking case.”). 
 158. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Lafe 
Solomon, acting general counsel, NLRB). 
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Although the Acting General Counsel properly followed 
NLRB precedent, as he was bound to do, it is less clear that the 
Board’s violation would have been upheld by courts of appeals, 
which through the long history of the NLRA have been less 
supportive than the Board of the policy of insulating employee 
union activity from economic retaliation. In several important 
cases, courts of appeals have stated that it is legitimate for em-
ployers to take actions that harm workers based on efforts to 
forestall lawful but economically costly union activity.159 For 
example, in N.L.R.B. v. Lassing, the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit took the position that the “reasonably anticipated 
increased costs, regardless of whether this increased cost 
was . . . caused by the advent of the Union or by some other fac-
tor,” justified the transfer of work.160
The General Counsel’s case would have been even weaker 
in the courts of appeals on the issue of remedy. For example, in 
Garwin Corp. v. N.L.R.B., an employer moved its base of manu-
facture from New York to Florida.
  
161 The Court of Appeals, in 
an opinion by Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger, accepted the 
Board’s finding that that “there was no genuine economic moti-
vation independent of the hostility toward the union” for the 
move.162 Garwin is one of the few cases in which major transfer 
of work was held to be a violation of the NLRA. But the Court 
limited the remedy, holding that it had to be directed to making 
whole the affected employees who lost jobs because of the trans-
fer.163 In the Boeing case, this would have been a minor cost, 
since no employees actually lost their jobs as a result of the 
transfer, and computing possible financial loss would have been 
almost impossible. Lawyers for the union were aware that they 
were unlikely to have obtained a strong remedy if the case pro-
ceeded; they were eager to settle.164
 
 159. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960).  
 They believed that the 
 160. Id.; see also N.L.R.B. v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F. 2d 324, 328–29 
(6th Cir. 1955). See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and 
Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 921 (1993). 
 161. 374 F.2d 295, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 162. Id. at 299. 
 163. Id. at 304. 
 164. Conversation with David Campbell, Attorney, International Associa-
tion of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (Fall, 2011); Conversation with Chris 
Corson, Attorney, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Work-
ers (Fall, 2011). 
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NLRB’s General Counsel shared this view and was similarly 
motivated.165
VI.  THE NLRA AND EMPLOYER DISCRETION   
 
Despite the language and policy of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 
there was never any real doubt about Boeing’s ability to assign 
the work as it chose. It could have avoided legal challenge by 
simply establishing the current three-line arrangement. In-
deed, if Boeing actually wanted to reduce the role of its union-
ized workers and to transfer the assembly of the 787 to South 
Carolina to avoid the IAM, it could have done so without legal 
consequences, had its officials not explained the decision to 
open its second line in Charleston in terms of responding to 
past strikes or the need to prevent future strikes.166
Even the General Counsel’s complaint acknowledged Boe-
ing’s ability to transfer work to South Carolina based on legiti-
mate economic considerations.
 Its contract 
with the IAM specifically gave it the right to make such deci-
sions in accordance with its business judgment.  
167
This tactic has been used many times by many employers, 
without interference from the NLRB.
 Any management labor lawyer 
worth his or her salt could have phrased an announcement to 
attribute Boeing’s actions to the economic advantages of South 
Carolina. In fact, Boeing could have transferred work to South 
Carolina in the course of business without press release or con-
troversy.  
168 During the 19’50s and 
19’60s, most of the garment industry moved from the northeast 
to the south with almost no interference from the law.169 Simi-
larly, in the 19’80s and 19’90s, the Board did not interfere to 
protect union jobs when employers such as Boeing transferred 
manufacturing work to other locations and countries.170
Although there are many examples of “runaway shops”—
unionized businesses transferring all or part of their operations 
 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. See supra Part I. 
 167. See Complaint, supra note 1. 
 168. See Estlund, supra note 160, at 946.  
 169. Garment Industry, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLEVELAND HISTORY, 
http://ech.case.edu/cgi/article.pl?id=GI (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 170. See Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn from the NLRA to Cre-
ate Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327, 
330 (2011) (“The unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA have failed to 
deter firms from illegal actions to prevent unionization.”). 
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to a non-union location—they have rarely, if ever, been ex-
plained in terms of the desire to get away from unions or work-
er rights. Instead, they have been justified, if at all, in terms of 
neutral economic advantages associated with the new location. 
Boeing could have done the same. Why, then, did Boeing, a 
company with top-flight counsel, ignore the traditional tech-
niques for masking efforts to bypass union facilities? 
The role of Boeing’s lawyers in shaping Boeing’s actions 
has puzzled many observers. Did they try to tone down the 
rhetoric used by management tying transfer of work on the 787 
to past lawful strikes? If not, was Boeing, as Richard Epstein 
has suggested, the victim of bad lawyering?171 Counsel for the 
union have wondered whether Boeing’s lawyers were informed 
in advance and approved of the issuance of the statements that 
led to the charges and complaint.172
The problems caused Boeing by the strikes were serious 
and costly. It obviously wanted to underline for its workforce in 
Everett that no matter how superior they were as workers, 
Boeing needed a period without strikes to meet the demand for 
the 787. There is little doubt that the message was received; 
Boeing’s workers in Everett are now working at top efficiency 
and have promised not to strike until 2016.
 In retrospect, it seems high-
ly unlikely that all these statements were made without legal 
review. The number of statements made and the period of time 
over which they continued suggest that Boeing’s lawyers knew 
and approved. But why would they do so? The likely answer is 
that Boeing was trying to prompt further concessions from the 
two rival states and simultaneously to issue a warning to its 
unionized workers that it was prepared to take drastic steps to 
avoid future strikes. Its lawyers probably concluded that it 
could do so without serious economic consequences. 
173
In warning its Everett workers about the dangers of strik-
ing, Boeing’s lawyers ran little risk. They were always in a po-
sition to terminate the legal challenge by coming to agreement 
 In the meantime, 
Boeing is hoping to be able to train its workforce in Charleston 
to perform comparably.  
 
 171. On Point: Boeing and the National Labor Relations Board, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Aug. 18, 2011), http://onpoint.wbur.org/2011/08/18/nlrb. 
 172. David Campbell, supra note 164; Chris Corson, supra note 164. 
 173. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 121, at 75. Four 
strikes had been called between 1995 and 2011. Henry Knight, Angie Cowan 
Hamada & Thomas D. Allison, Boeing v. NLRB, A.B.A. (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/ 
1110_aball_flash/1110_aball_flash_boeing_nlrb.html. 
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with the IAM. And even if the unfair labor practice complaint 
was tried, the danger of a disruptive remedy was slight. As Sol-
omon pointed out at the House Oversight Committee hearing, 
“Boeing will have every opportunity at the hearing to establish 
that it would be unduly burdensome for them to take the se-
cond line back to Washington State.”174
VII.  THE CONSTANTLY WEAKENING ROLE OF THE 
NLRB   
 If Boeing could do so—
and it seems probable that it could—the Board, even if it found 
a violation, would do nothing to disturb the Charleston assem-
bly line. If it found that Boeing in fact violated the NLRA, the 
Board would most likely have ordered Boeing to increase utili-
zation of its Everett facility for assembly of the 787. This is 
what Boeing has chosen to do on its own and is what seemed 
from the first to be the likely solution of the issue. And even so 
mild a remedy might well have been rejected by a Court of Ap-
peals. A broader Board order would have been most unlikely, 
and enforcement of such an order by the courts even more un-
likely.  
The Board’s critics portrayed it as a powerful and power-
seeking agency capable of challenging and overturning major 
economic decisions by huge companies—threatening jobs and 
inhibiting job creators.175 But to those of us who have studied 
the Board over the years, it is an agency with a mighty man-
date, but with very little power and few allies. The Board can-
not effectively protect the jobs of workers who support unions. 
It has no effective remedy when employers flaunt their duty to 
bargain in good faith with a union selected by their workers. 
The Board does not have the power to significantly strengthen 
the almost atrophied right to strike. And because of a series of 
court opinions giving employers the right to make captive audi-
ence speeches and denying the union a right of access,176 its 
election processes will continue to favor employers. The free 
choice that the Act is meant to protect has long been illusory.177
 
 174. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 
 
84. 
 175. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz & Armour, supra note 132; Santorum, supra 
note 132. 
 176. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. United Steelworkers of Am., CIO, 357 U.S. 357, 
361–63 (1958). 
 177. Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; 
Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125 (2003).  
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The Supreme Court has led the way in rejecting interpre-
tations of the NLRA that limit traditional employer powers. 
This practice began early in the Act’s history and has remained 
a constant theme since. For example, the Court announced in 
1938, without reference to the NLRA, that an employer could 
hire permanent replacement workers to take jobs previously 
held by strikers.178 In the 1950s, the Court, overruling the 
Board, held that employers could make captive audience 
speeches to their employees during an organizing campaign 
and were not required to give the union a chance to respond.179 
This ruling was solidified in 1991, when the Court rejected the 
Board’s efforts to apply a balancing test that would on occasion 
permit union organizers limited access to company property.180 
The Court has regularly overruled the Board to narrow the def-
inition of employees under the NLRA.181 It has created catego-
ries of employees not referenced in the statute who are not en-
titled to unionize.182 It has denied the Board’s ability to impose 
even non-controversial contract terms when employers refuse, 
in bad faith, to come to agreement with a newly selected un-
ion.183 As a result, the Board is essentially powerless to remedy 
employer refusals to bargain in good faith.184
  CONCLUSION   
  
The anti-Board rhetoric of Republican candidates and 
right-wing commentators, while largely based on illusion, had a 
significant effect on public opinion.185
 
 178. N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938). 
 It gained traction from 
the implied metaphor of the heavy hand of government stifling 
needed economic activity. The metaphor was implicit in the 
remarks of Representative Trey Gowdy: “An unelected execu-
 179. United Steelworkers of Am., CIO, 357 U.S. at 361–63. 
 180. Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527 (1991).  
 181. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 
267, 289 (1974). But see N.L.R.B. v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 
706, 711–12 (2001). 
 182. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686–88 (1980). 
 183. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408 (1952). 
 184. For a careful scholarly discussion of the Board’s decline, see generally 
Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of 
the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569 
(2007). 
 185. Albert Milliron, 64% Say Boeing Should Be Allowed to Operate Non-
Union Plant in South Carolina, POLITISITE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www 
.politisite.com/2011/09/15/64-say-boeing-should-be-allowed-to-operate-plant-in 
-south-carolina. 
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tive branch entity spokesperson is telling a private company 
what it can make, where it can make it, and how much of it it 
can make.”186
  The weak response by most Democrats, including the 
President, is perhaps attributable to the fact that they found no 
compelling counter-metaphor to justify the Board’s actions. 
Pro-union bloggers had their own image: that of a huge corpo-
ration stamping on the rights of workers.
  
187
Given that the NLRB never ruled on the complaint against 
Boeing and that the action of the General Counsel was prelimi-
nary, was non-binding, and never threatened to limit Boeing’s 
plans, it is surprising that the episode became the focus of so 
much commentary and hostility. Why was there such a power-
ful counterattack launched against a legal action that was so 
weak and relatively insignificant?  
 It was an old-
fashioned image, out of keeping with the moderate image of to-
day’s leading Democrats, few of whom were willing to risk be-
ing condemned for class warfare by being critical of a corpora-
tion that was adding jobs in an economically weak state. 
Boeing is one of our last manufacturing champions, able to take 
on the world in the creation of highly sophisticated products, of 
which the Dreamliner is the most recent. To the uneasy yet si-
lent Democrats and moderates, the complaint against Boeing 
must have been seen, at best, as reflecting the unfortunate 
costs to productivity and efficiency that come with activist gov-
ernment protection of unions.  
For Republicans and right-wing commentators, the case of-
fered a chance to attack multiple enemies and simultaneously 
reinforce the image of corporations as job creators. A prominent 
strategy of the attackers was to suggest that the case revealed 
an anti-business cabal joining together the NLRB, the admin-
istration, and organized labor.188
 
 186. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 
 As part of a cabal with im-
portant government agencies, organized labor appears powerful 
and even threatening to the rights of ordinary workers. The 
government, because it is beholden to organized labor, is forced 
to oppose job creation, free choice, and the rule of law. These 
themes were struck repeatedly in the attacks against the 
84 (testimony of Trey 
Gowdy, Representative, South Carolina). 
 187. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 121. 
 188. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz & Armour, supra note 132; Santorum, supra 
note 132. 
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Board.189 They are evident in the opening statement of Con-
gressman Issa during the House Oversight Committee hearing, 
who, in the course of a few paragraphs, announced Boeing’s in-
nocence: “Evidence suggests Boeing’s decision to build the new 
assembly plant in South Carolina was simply an act of mana-
gerial discretion.”190 He also stressed the political power of or-
ganized labor: “Any appearance that Mr. Solomon’s decision 
was tailored to reward the President’s powerful financial and 
political supporters—big labor—would be disturbing. The 
American people deserve to know if so-called independent regu-
latory agencies are exceeding their legal authority to pursue a 
partisan agenda.”191 And he implied the culpability of the 
Obama administration: “Why would the administration stand 
in the way of reindustrialization of the American work 
force[?]”192
The weakness of the NLRB was revealed, but not caused, 
by the Boeing dispute. Numerous factors have contributed to 
the Board’s decline, including the increasing activism of review-
ing courts, and its own unsatisfactory performance, marked by 
its shifting maze of politically motivated decisions.
 These comments, together with the anti-Board, anti-
labor editorials and speeches, served to create an alternate 
universe, one in which unions are politically powerful, the 
Board a powerful activist agency, and large companies seeking 
to create jobs for workers. But the reality revealed by the battle 
over Boeing is far different. The weakness of the labor move-
ment was shown by the failure of Democrats, including the 
President, to speak out. The Board became a fashionable 
punching bag without taking any action as an agency, and Boe-
ing became an object of solicitude and admiration. 
193
 
 189. See Santorum, supra note 
 But it 
would be a mistake to simply do away with the Board. An 
agency to protect the rights of workers, one that commands the 
respect of employers and unions and the support of the courts, 
is still needed. It has been a long time since the Board in its 
current form played such a role. It is most unlikely that it will 
ever be able to create a labor policy based on properly con-
ceived, consistently applied law and generally accepted princi-
132. 
 190. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Darrell 
E. Issa, Chair, Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, Representative, 
California). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  
 193. See generally Liebman, supra note 184. 
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pals without significant statutory change. It should, however, 
be possible to make the Board more expert and less political, 
and to make the process of judicial review more rational.  
A starting point would be to end the current political focus 
of Board appointments. It would be possible to establish a ros-
ter of labor relations neutrals, approved by both labor and 
management, for possible appointment to the Board. For ex-
ample, the National Academy of Arbitrators194
The process of judicial review also needs amending. What 
is needed is a single reviewing appeals court, perhaps one com-
posed of labor experts already on the bench; Judges Douglas 
Ginsburg and Marsha S. Berzon come to mind. A non-partisan 
expert labor Board whose opinions are reviewed by a single ex-
pert court could help to create, at this late date, the type of la-
bor law system contemplated so many years ago by those who 
first fought to create the NLRA. 
 includes many 
people who have earned through their decisions the respect of 
both union and management leaders.  
 
 
 194. See NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, http://www.naarb.org (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2014). 
